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ABSTRACT: An examination of several approaches to the force of ‘probably’, when used to qualify the 
conclusions of arguments and inferences. Among the views examined are those of Toulmin and Wilfrid 
Sellars.  The paper recommends taking the utterance of “Probably p’ to be licensing or authorizing the 
adoption of a particular doxastic attitude toward p, and offers a functional account of that particular 
doxastic attitude, namely expecting that p will turn out to be the case. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent paper I advanced what I called a qualitative version of evidence 
proportionalism, one of who central ideas was that the type of cognitive attitude we adopt 
toward the conclusion of an inference must be appropriate to the evidence or premisses 
on which that inference is based.  I suggested that the we use modal qualifiers like 
‘probably,’ ‘presumably,’ ‘possibly,’ or ‘almost certainly’ to qualify our conclusions in 
order to indicate when and how it is reasonable to use such conclusions as the premisses 
of further arguments. I went on to suggest (pp. 130-131) that such modal qualifiers are 
connected with a range of cognitive or doxastic attitudes – presuming that p, expecting 
that p and being certain that p, for example – and that each of these doxastic attitudes can 
be type-identified by reference to the functional role in our cognitive lives that it bestows 
on its propositional content.  The present paper is part of the attempt to flesh out these 
ideas in somewhat more detail. It is a first pass at showing how a Touminesque account1 
of the force of ‘Probably’ can be unpacked in terms of a particular doxastic attitude – 
expecting that p will turn out to be the case – and how that attitude can be type-identified 
by reference to its functional role in our cognitive lives. 
 
 
∗ Note: What follows is a summary of the working draft of a much longer paper. The commentator was 
supplied with the full working draft. An electronic version of the full draft, together with its four 
appendices, is available upon request. 
1 Toulmin’s idea that the function of ‘Probably’ and ‘Probable’ is to express guarded commitment or 
assertion plays little or no role in this paper. For my comment on that idea, see Appendix D.  However, in 
section 5 of Part III I draw on what I think are more important aspects of Toulmin’s treatment of ‘Probable’ 
in Uses of Argument. 
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The account of ‘probable’ I attempt to develop takes part of its inspiration from Bob 
Ennis recent work on ‘probable’ – work which stresses  
a) that the “qualitative” concept of ‘probable’ in not reducible to or replaceable 
by what Carnap called a “quantitative” concept of probability (see especially 
Ennis 2007) , and  
b) that what is probable is what we are justified in treating in a certain way 
(Ennis 2007b).  
But I am led by these and other considerations to something that resembles Sellars’ idea 
(1964, p. 198) that 
 
[i]n the basic non-metrical sense of “probable” (in relation to which all other senses are to 
be understood), to say of a statement or proposition that it is probable is, in first 
approximation, to say that it is worthy of credence, that it is acceptable in the sense of 
being worthy of acceptance; that is, to put it in a way that points to a finer grained 
analysis, it is to say that all things considered there is good reason to accept it. 
 
However, where Sellars speaks of accepting that p I am going to speak of expecting that 
p.2  
One way to understand expecting is to take the notions of belief and probability 
for granted and to identify expecting that p with believing that it is likely or probable that 
p.  Such an approach leaves us with the problem of explaining what it is for a state of 
affairs to be likely or probable. In this paper, I propose to reverse the order of 
explanation, as it were.  I propose to illuminate what it is for something to be probable by 
appealing to a prior notion of expectation. 
II. REASONING, PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND MODAL QUALIFIERS  
Part II of the paper draws on Toulmin’s distinction between the context- or field-
independent force of these modal qualifiers and the criteria for their application - criteria 
which will vary from context to context (or in his view, from field to field). I embrace 
Toulmin’s idea that the force the modal operators of interest lies in the “practical 
implications” for the role that their propositional contents are to play in our cognitive 
lives. Highlighting Toulmin’s account of ‘possibly’ – according to which what is possible 
is what deserves to be considered in the context at hand – I emphasize that  
a) the implications of the modal qualifiers are practical in the sense that they are 
action-guiding,  
b) the practicality in question involves epistemically normative considerations. 
 
                                                 
 
2 See Appendix B for an overview of Sellars’ view of probability and induction from which this quotation 
is draw. See section 5 of that appendix for the problems I see in Sellars’ use of  the term “acceptance” for 
setting out his view. 
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III. THE FORCE OF ‘PROBABLY P’ – REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
Moore has pointed out that there is something wrong or inconsistent in saying 
1) It’s raining but I don’t believe that it’s raining 
Now there is clearly not any inconsistency, pragmatic or otherwise, in saying 
2) It will probably rain tomorrow, but I’m not convinced it will.  
But it seems to me that there is clearly something incoherent, or at least odd, about 
saying: 
3) It is probable that it will rain tomorrow but I don’t expect that that it will.3 
The problem with (3) is, I think, a pragmatic inconsistency due to the fact that it is not 
reasonable to refuse to expect what you concede to be probable.   But why not? 
My suggestion is this: 
Saying “it is probable that p” is equivalent to saying “it is reasonable to 
expect that p.”4  
What I am suggesting is indeed a variant of the Sellarsian idea quoted in section 2 above, 
and might be expressed as follows: 
 
In the basic non-metrical sense of “probable” (in relation to which all other senses are to 
be understood), to say of a statement or proposition that it is probable is, in first 
approximation, to say that it is worthy of credence, that it is acceptable in the sense of 
being worthy of qualified acceptance; that is, to put it in a way that points to a finer 
grained analysis, it is to say that all things considered there is good reason to expect it to 
be true. 
IV. “QUALIFIED” BELIEF AND/OR ACCEPTANCE 
To make sense of expecting, in terms of which I want to unpack the idea of probability, 
we need to make sense of qualified belief and/or acceptance. And like Adler (2002, 
p.232) I want to make a sharp, qualitative distinction between full or unqualified belief 
and the states of “partial belief” which (in Adler’s words)  
 
are most naturally presented with such qualifications as "pretty sure," "very sure," "more 
sure than not," as well as "think," "suspect," or "inclined to believe" – paradigmatically, 
"I am pretty sure that p."5
                                                 
 
3 Though not, of course, about “It is probable that it will rain tomorrow but Sam doesn’t expect that that it 
will.” 
4 This equivalence is quite different from the following equivalence, which quite clearly does not obtain: 
Saying “it is probable that p” is equivalent to saying “it is reasonable to be convinced that p.”  
5 Adler adds (p. 232): “Expressions for partial belief are not the same as (objective) probability judgments, 
for example, ‘The probability that the coin will land heads is 3/5.’ Probability judgments attribute 
properties, dispositions, or propensities to objects. Although they can, of course, be based on evidence, 
expressions of them are not incomplete without mention of evidence. However, the two are easily confused, 
since, for brevity, in expressing our partial beliefs, we cut away from reference to the believer or his 
3 
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Part IV begins with a reworking of the distinction between believing a proposition and 
accepting it – a distinction to found in L. J. Cohen, in M. E. Bratman and in several of my 
recent papers. In this presentation I omit the details of that reworking, since what is most 
important for the project at hand is the distinction between full or unqualified belief or 
acceptance and the sort of qualified belief or acceptance that transpires when we expect 
something will turn out to be the case but are not sure that it will. 
I claim that there are two key or crucial differences between unqualified belief or 
acceptance, on the one hand, and qualified belief or acceptance, on the other. 
a) Unqualified belief or acceptance that p requires discounting the possibility 
that not-p, whereas qualified belief or acceptance involves acknowledging that 
there is a real or genuine possibility that not-p.6 
b) Adjunction (or what Bratman [1999, p. 19] calls agglomeration) applies to 
unqualified belief and acceptance, but does not apply to qualified belief or 
acceptance. That is to say, if it is reasonable to believe/accept that p and it is 
reasonable to believe/accept that q, then it is reasonable to believe/accept that 
p & q.  But from the fact that it is reasonable to expect that p and it is 
reasonable to expect that q, it does not follow that it is reasonable to expect 
that p & q.  Otherwise, whenever it were reasonable to expect of each 
individual ticket in a lottery that it will lose, it would be reasonable to expect 
that no ticket will win. 
(I suspect, by the way, that point (b) is a consequence of point (a), but I do not know how 
to prove that that is so.) 
I maintain that this contrast should not be reduced to the idea that unqualified 
belief or acceptance that p is according a probability of 1 to the proposition that p (and 
thereby assigning a probability of 0 to the proposition that not-p).7  For declining to treat 
the falsity of p as something that deserves to be taken into account as a possibility need 
not be the same as assigning a probability of 0 to the proposition that not-p. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                 
evidence. Typically, we say ‘It's probable that Mary will meet us’ just as we say ‘It's possible that Mary 
will meet us.’ In either case what is usually meant involves a disguised reference to the asserter (and his 
evidence) – it's probable or possible, given the asserter's beliefs.” 
6 Compare Adler (2002, pp. 36ff.), where it is maintained that the reasons adequate for justifying belief 
(and he means full or unqualified belief) must be conclusive reasons. Though Adler does not spell out in 
detail which is necessary for a reason to be conclusive, there are strong hints on p. 37 that conclusive 
reasons for believing that p must rule out any “serious” possibility that would render it false that p. 
7 Compare Bratman (1987, pp. 36-37): “None of this [i.e., what he has said about the importance of flat-out 
belief] assumes that there is a simple relation between flat-out belief and degrees of confidence. In 
particular, it does not assume that to believe flat-out that I have only one car I must assign this proposition a 
subjective probability of 1. If you were to offer me a bet in which I pay one dollar if I own only one car but 
receive one million dollars if it turns [p. 37] out that I own a second car, I might well accept this bet; for I 
judge that there is better than a one-in-a-million chance that, unknown to me I own a second car. (Perhaps 
my aunt has just died and left me her car in her will.) Still, though I would take such a bet if offered, I 
believe flat out that I own just one car. What makes my attitude toward my having just one car one of flat-
out belief, and not merely the assignment of some probability somewhat less than 1, is, at least in part, its 
distinctive role in the background of my further planning-in particular its role in providing a screen of 
admissibility for my options.”  But see also his remarks in Bratman 1999, pp. 28-29, especially his 
comment that “practical pressures can make it reasonable of me to accept that p in a certain practical 
context even if it is not reasonable of me to assign p a probability of 1 in my theoretical reflections.” It is 
unclear to me exactly how this latter comment fits with the passage I just quoted from Bratman 1987. 
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a reasonable policy is to assign a probability of 0 only to those propositions which are 
“logically impossible”, or only to those proposition which semantically entail 
propositions which are logically impossible. But it is, as far as I can see, logically 
possible that I am a brain in a vat, but by my lights that is not a possibility that deserves 
serious consideration in most contexts.8 It is just when someone’s “default” position is 
take this attitude toward the proposition that she is a brain in a vat that it becomes correct 
to say of her that she believes without qualification that she is not a brain in a vat. 
V. EXPECTING THAT P 
Part V begins by pointing out some of the ways in which what we expect and what we 
consider to be genuinely possible can and do function as reasons in contexts of 
deliberation.  For example, if I want to meet Saul this afternoon and I expect that if I go 
to the library this afternoon I will meet him there, then I have a (non-conclusive) reason 
to go to the library this afternoon. For another example, the mere possibility that a nuclear 
accident like the one which occurred in Chernobyl will occur at a nuclear plants in the US 
or Canada  is a reason for scrutinizing the pros and cons of tolerating such plants 
especially carefully. 
It is clear that, against the background of conative and/or evaluative attitudes, 
attitudes such as expecting and treating as genuinely possible can supply considerations 
that play premiss-like roles in the inferences that occur in the context of deliberation. 
Bratman (1987, pp. 36-37) once treated the cognitive component of deliberation as 
consisting only of  “flat-out” or unqualified beliefs. Later (1999, chapter 2) he 
acknowledged and stressed the importance of context-relative acceptance (or “taking for 
granted”) as a crucial component of the “cognitive background” of deliberation.  I am 
maintaining that in addition to the sorts of unqualified belief and acceptance Bratman has 
recognized, we need to explore the roles in deliberation of expecting that p and taking 
seriously the possibility that p. 
I submit that these cognitive attitudes are to be distinguished functionally, by 
distinguishing 
a) what they can be reasons for (that in relationship to these attitudes are inputs)  
b) the circumstances under which they can play the role of reasons. 
c) what gives rise to and/or what justifies them (that in relationship to these 
attitudes are outputs)  
                                                 
 
8 Adler has also argued that doubt is compatible with full belief – see especially his defense of that view in 
chapter 10 of Adler 2002. Though I am personally not completely comfortable with the arguments Adler 
advances for that thesis, I think it is quite correct that straightforwardly believing a proposition is consistent 
with varying degrees of confidence in that proposition – that I can be “more certain” of some of the things I 
believe than I am of others. That is why in Pinto 2003b, pp. 6-7, in addition to acceptance attitudes and to 
doxastic attitudes, I recognized degrees of confidence as a third, distinct category of cognitive attitude.  
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VI. THE ROLE OF THE POSSIBLE AND THE PROBABLE IN DELIBERATION 
1. There are of course models of decision-making in which the assignment of numerical 
probabilities plays a central role. Crudely put, in most such models one chooses among 
courses of action on the basis of expected utilities, and one determines the expected 
utility of each course of action by listing its possible outcomes and then adding up the 
products of the numeric probabilities and numeric utilities of those outcomes.9 Clearly 
there are decision problems for which such methods are appropriate. However, 
Bayesianism notwithstanding, those methods are appropriate only in situations where 
there is an evidentiary basis for assigning numeric probabilities to outcomes and where a 
principled approach to assigning cardinal numbers to the utility of relevant outcomes is 
available. Very frequently, perhaps even in the majority of cases in which we make 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, those enabling conditions don’t apply. In that 
event, we must fall back on qualitative probability statements – that is to say, we must 
fall back on what it is reasonable to expect.  
Part VI of the paper contains an attempt to identify specific roles that expecting 
and taking something to be a genuine possibility play in deliberation.  
 
2. First I try to identify roles that taking something to be possible play in helping to 
determine the options worth considering. I try to capture these roles in two principles (P1 
and P2) which purport to state necessary conditions an option must meet in order to be 
worth considering. 
P1  I have a (non-conclusive reason) for considering a conceivable course of 
action an option worth considering only if  I am prepared to treat that 
course of action as one that it is “genuinely possible” for me to perform 
And, of course, my reason will be a good reason if and only if it is reasonable for me to 
do so. 
Moreover, a conceivable course of action is an option worth considering in a context of 
deliberation only if it has some bearing on what I desire, prefer or intend to do. Hence I 
submit that we recognize a second sort of constraint on options worth considering: 
P2 I have a (non-conclusive reason) for considering a conceivable course of 
action A an option worth considering only if I treat it is “genuinely 
possible” that performing A will produce some specific outcome I desire 
or prefer or will make it possible for me to perform some other specific 
action that I intend to perform – in short, only if I treat it as “genuinely 
possible” that performing A will result in some specific benefit . 
Again, my reason will be a good reason only if it is reasonable for me to treat it as 
“genuinely possible” that this course of action will have such result. 
Finally I propose a third principle which purports to capture a sufficient and 
necessary condition for having for having a (non-conclusive) reason to settle on or adopt 
a course of action. 
                                                 
 
9 Pollock (1995, chapter 6, section 4)  offers a what appears to be quite different way of conceiving of the 
“expected value of a plan,” which I don’t attempt to consider or deal with here. 
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P3 I have a (non-conclusive) reason for settling on a conceivable course of 
action if and only if  I assume or expect that performing that course of 
action will result in some specific benefit. 
Let X be the benefit I have in mind. Then my reason for settling on a course of action A 
will be a good (non-conclusive) reason if and only if (a) it is reasonable for me to assume 
or expect that performing action A will result in X and (b) it is reasonable for me to treat 
X as a benefit.    
The reader or listener can perhaps see where I am going with this.  I am 
suggesting that a defining function of expecting as a cognitive attitude is that it can in the 
absence of certainty, and in conjunction with the evaluative attitude of treating something 
as a benefit, render its propositional content a reason for settling on a course of action. 
 
3. Notice that when I tried in P3 to state the conditions for having a reason to adopt a 
course of action, I used the disjunctive expression “assume or expect.” I did this quite 
deliberately, because I concede to Bratman (1999, chapter 2, esp. pp. 22-23)  that when 
we are deliberating we often assume or take for granted things we are not certain of.10 
That is to say, we often simplify our deliberations by taking for granted what we only 
expect to be the case.  In the remainder of Part VI of the paper, I develop an argument 
that purports to show that we cannot always simplify our deliberations by taking for 
granted that our expectations will pan out.  The argument concerns  deliberations that 
result in what I call “branching plans” – plans which involve conditional steps such as  
a) If the weather tomorrow is sunny and warm, we will have a picnic (Plan A) 
b) If the weather tomorrow is not sunny and warm, we will go to the theater. 
(Plan B). 
The argument turns on the fact that such branching plans often commit us to “preparatory 
steps” we must take today, in order to keep tomorrow’s options open and that often the 
costs incurred by taking those preparatory steps are not negligible.11  
I argue that where we require a branching plan whose preparatory steps incur non-
negligible costs, we can no longer employ the simplifying strategy of  taking for granted 
or assume what we only expect to be the case. Here we see quite clearly the function of 
expecting as a cognitive attitude which in the absence of certainty, and in conjunction 
with the evaluative attitude of treating something as a benefit, can render its 
propositional content a reason for settling on a course of action. 
                                                 
 
10 Bratman’s example is “taking it for granted that it won’t rain even though I am not certain of this” – 
which is clearly a case of  
11 I introduce corollaries of P1 and P3 as follows: 
P1a We have a (non-conclusive reason) for including a possible branch in our plan only if we 
are prepared to treat its triggering condition as “genuinely possible.” 
P3a If we judge the costs associated with the preparatory steps of a conceivable branch to be 
more than negligible, we have a (non-conclusive reason) for including that branch in our 
plan if and only if  either (i) we expect that its triggering condition will occur and that the 
branch will produce specific benefits or (ii) we expect to obtain other benefits from its 
preparatory steps even if its triggering condition does not occur. 
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VII. PROBABILITY AND RELATIVE FREQUENCY 
I said above in section 9 that there is a third factor by which cognitive attitudes are to be 
distinguished, namely  
c) what gives rise to and/or what justifies them (that in relationship to these 
attitudes are outputs)  
A thorough treatment of expecting that p would therefore include a full account of what 
gives rise to it and/or and what justifies it – something that is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, a few closing remarks about this matter are in order. 
It is clear, I think, that one sort of thing which gives rise to and justifies both expecting 
that an event of a certain kind will occur, as well as taking its occurrence to be a genuine 
possibility, is our knowledge or belief about the relative frequency with which events of 
that kind have occurred in the past. 12  Even the claims that we judge to be “qualitatively” 
probable are typically (though by no means always) backed up by claims about or 
estimates or relative frequency, albeit quite vague ones: “that happens all the time,” 
“that’s pretty rare,” “most of the people of such-and-such a description are like this,” “no 
need worry about that, since it almost never happens,” and so on.  In such cases, we may 
construe the inference to be one in which an expectation that p is grounded in the 
acceptance of some proposition about a relative frequency. And where we judge the 
inference to have been a good one we will judge that it is reasonable to expect that p – 
which, in my scheme of things, is to judge that it is probable that p.  Looking at things in 
this manner offers a way of fleshing out the variant on Sellars’ account of ‘probable’ that 
I floated in section 6 above, namely that 
 
[i]n the basic non-metrical sense of “probable” (in relation to which all other senses are to 
be understood), to say of a statement or proposition that it is probable…it is to say that all 
things considered there is good reason to expect it to be true. 
 
It is especially important to note my way of looking at things can accommodate 
expectations about the relative frequency with which we will encounter situations of type 
A among situations of type B in the future, or among “unexamined” situations of type B.  
It can therefore accommodate probability statements about such anticipated relative 
frequencies.  This, it seems to me, introduces numeric considerations into the 
“propositional content” to which the modal qualifier “probable” is applied, and  it may 
turn out to be a first step in the direction of introducing a quantitative or numeric concept 
of probability on the basis of the qualitative concept of probability I have tried to sketch 
in this paper.  
I do not have the competence to discuss in detail the technical aspects of the 
relation between epistemic concepts of probability, on the one hand, and considerations 
of relative frequency, on the other – nor, for that matter, the relationship between what 
Carnap called probability1 and probability2.  It is worth noting, however, Carnap’s 
                                                 
 
12 Clearly this is not the only sort of thing that gives rise to and may justify these attitudes. Thus prominent 
among are reasons for expecting are considerations of analogy and similarity. I expect John to be familiar 
with French history because I know that John and Bill are good friends who went through school together 
and that Bill is familiar with French history.  
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discussion (1962, §42) of what he took to be “the shift in the meaning of the word 
probability.” He claims (p. 182) that the word ‘probable’ and its counterparts in German, 
French and Latin 
 
were  used originally in everyday speech for something that is not certain but may be 
expected to happen or presumed to be the case. [Italics not in the original] 
 
He then suggests that this common use led to  “the similar or more specific use in early 
books on probability” in which it was meant (pp. 182-83) 
 
in  the sense of ‘evidential support for an assumption (or event)’ or ‘rational credibility of 
an assumption’, and, more specifically, as ‘numerical degree of support of this 
credibility’. In other words, ‘probability’ [in these early books] had the sense of what we 
have called probability1. Its use in the sense of  probability2 is of relatively recent date; it 
goes back not more than about a hundred years. 13  
 
What Carnap thinks was the sense in which ‘probable’ was “originally used” is close to 
the sense which I think it commonly bears today. 14  As for the quantitative or “metric” 
uses of probable, my sympathies are with the frequentists. I have therefore included, in 
Appendix C, a somewhat crude and preliminary sketch of how the results of common 
applications of mathematical statistics in which a metric concept of probability occurs 
might be recast in terms of the vocabulary I’ve tried to outline in this paper. 
 
 
APPENDIX A: BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE  
 
APPENDIX B: SELLARS ON PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION 
 
APPENDIX C: STATISTICAL PROBABILITIES 
 
APPENDIX D:  GUARDED ASSERTION 
 
link to commentary
                                                 
 
13 Carnap thinks (p. 186) its use in this sense really begins with Venn in 1866, though (pp. 186-87) “it only 
was a half century later that comprehensive systematic theories were developed which took probability2 as 
their basis. This was done, on the one hand, by Hans Reichenabach, and Richard von Mises and, on the 
other, by R.A.Fisher and subsequently by the majority of contemporary mathematical statisticians.”  
14 Whether Carnap is historically right about its original use is debatable. A somewhat different picture is 
presented in Ian Hacking’s revealing accounts of the emergence of the modern concept of probability, 
which he dates from the late 17th century, and  in which he treats the quantitative or at least comparative 
aspects of the emerging concept as essential to what emerges at that time. Consider the following comment 
(Hacking 1975, p. 1) about the concept whose history he is tracking: “Probability has two aspects. It is 
connected with the degree of belief warranted by evidence, and it is connected with the tendency, displayed 
by some chance devices, to produce stable relative frequencies.” But in Hacking’s account, before about 
1660 probability was an attribute of “opinion” as contrasted with “knowledge”, and a probable opinion was 
not one supported by evidence, but rather one which was approved by some authority – see chapters 3 and 
4 of Hacking 1975. 
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